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Abstract:  
The efforts of the European Commission to reduce regional inequalities over its territory 
continues to attract the attention of researchers.  The purpose of this paper is to perform an 
exploratory investigation of the relationship between  the spatial distribution of regional 
income and of regional development funds among 145 European regions over 1989-1999.  
Using a set of tools of spatial statistics, we first detect the presence of global and local spatial 
autocorrelation in the distribution of regional per capita incomes, traducing that rich (poor) 
regions tend to be clustered close to other rich (poor) regions, and in the distribution of 
regional growth rate and regional funds.  Second, the results of LISA statistics conclude to 
the presence of spatial heterogeneity in the form of two spatial clusters of rich and poor 
regions over the decade, highlighting the persistence of a significant core-periphery pattern 
among European regions.  Finally, an exploratory analysis reveals  a negative correlation 
between growth and initial income, that tends to indicate  β -convergence.  A positive 
relationship between regional growth and structural funds is identified among the significant 
results as well.  Only Andalucia, Galicia and Sterea Ellada show atypical linkages.  These 
results suggest that further research should include spatial effects and the distribution of 
regional funds in the spatial econometric estimation of regional convergence in Europe. 
                                                 
1  This paper has been written while I was a Fulbright Visiting-Researcher at the Regional Economics 
Applications Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (USA).  I have benefited from useful 
comments of the participants of the 49th Annual North American Meeting of the RSAI and the participants of 
the 42nd Annual Meeting of the WRSA.  I would like to thank most especially Julie Le Gallo,  Phil Rees and two 
anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions.  Financial support from the Région Aquitaine (France) is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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1 Introduction 
The phenomenon of persistent income disparities among European regions has been widely 
studied in the literature, using β -convergence2 models, most of the time based on neo-
classical specifications (Esteban, 1994; Neven and Gouyette, 1995).  Together with σ -
convergence,3 these concepts have been criticized for several econometric problems they 
bring about, like Galton’s fallacy problem, and their inadequacy to explain economic 
polarization, persistent poverty and clustering (Quah, 1993).  In contrast, the concepts of 
convergence clubs (Durlauf and Johnson, 1995; Chatterji, 1992; Quah, 1996) and core-
periphery (Krugman, 1991a, 1991b; Fujita et al., 1999) are compatible with the existence of 
multiple, locally stable steady state equilibria that are more relevant in the European regional 
case. 
Another often-raised criticism comes from the fact that  the majority of these empirical tests 
of regional income convergence are based on the same hypotheses as the ones underlying 
international income convergence: regions are considered as isolated entities, as if their 
geographical location and potential interregional linkages did not matter.  Only recently, with 
the development of the appropriate tools of spatial statistics and spatial econometrics 
(Anselin, 1988, 2001; Anselin and Berra, 1998), has the role of spatial effects  been 
considered in empirical works.  These tools have been applied to regional convergence in the 
United-States (Rey and Montouri, 1999; Rey, 2001), in Europe (Fingleton, 1999 and 2001; 
Baumont et al., 2002; Bivand and Brunstad, 2002), in China (Ying, 2000), in Brazil 
(Magalhães et al., 2000), in Chile (Aroca et al., 2000) and Turkey (Gezici and Hewings, 
2002).  The underlying idea, based on economic geographic theories and growth theories, is 
that forces that are driving the relocation/agglomeration process and hence generating an 
even/uneven regional development may be attributed to such factors as productivity 
                                                 
2    β -convergence occurs when the poor regions tend to grow faster than the rich ones. 
3    σ -convergence occurs when there is a reduction in the standard deviation of regional incomes. 
 
3
(Hirschman, 1958), transportation infrastructures (Krugman and Venables, 1995, 1996), 
technology and knowledge spillovers (Martin and Ottaviano, 1999), factor mobility 
(Krugman, 1991a, b; Puga, 1999), each of which has an explicit geographic component.  
Since geographic spillover effects influence the patterns of regional development, it is highly 
probable that these influences exhibit a non-random distinctive geographic pattern.  Applied 
to the spatial distribution of income, evidence reveals that the rich (poor) regions have a 
propensity to be clustered close to other rich (poor) regions.   
However, the European Commission considers regional imbalances unacceptable on 
distributional (spatial equity) and political grounds.  The successive enlargements of the 
European Community to less developed countries have made regional disparities so 
prominent that 68% of structural funds are now devoted to the least developed regions 
(objective 1).  Structural funds are the most important instruments of the European regional 
development policy with Ecu 154.5 billion (at 1994 prices) allocated over 1994-1999.  
However, their impact on regional development is not yet clear: most of the structural funds 
finance public infrastructures that are supposed to enhance cohesion among European regions 
(Aschauer, 1989).  Many of these investments finance transportation infrastructures that 
result in a decrease in transportation costs, thereby potentially altering the locational 
attractiveness of regions.  As a result, the benefits from these investments do not necessarily 
remain to benefit only the region in which they are implemented (Martin, 2000; Vickerman, 
1996).   
The purpose of this paper is to apply some newly developed techniques of spatial analysis to 
investigate the ability of the European Commission to favor cohesion through its regional 
policy.  To this end, we perform an exploratory analysis of the relationship between the 
spatial distribution of per capita GDP and regional funds among 145 European regions over 
the period 1989-1999, a decade that corresponds to the first two programming periods in 
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which European regional development policy was developed..  The paper proceeds as 
follows: section 2 describes the linkages between regional funds and even/uneven regional 
development.  Section 3 presents the data.  In section 4, we perform the exploratory spatial 
data analysis of the distribution of regional per capita GDP, of structural funds and of 
additional funds.  The paper concludes with a summary and some closing remarks.  
 
2. Impact of structural funds on the spatial distribution of income  
European regional assistance over the 1989-1999 period dealt with six different objectives, 
the most important of which, with 68% of total structural funds devoted to this objective, was 
the objective 1, designed to address the economic development of the least prosperous 
regions.  NUTS II level regions1 were eligible under this objective when their per capita GDP 
(in PPP, Purchasing Power Parity) was below 75% of the Community average.  The other 
objectives were respectively devoted to the regions affected by industrial crisis (objective 2), 
by long-term unemployment (objective 3), the adaptation of the labor force (objective 4), 
agricultural structures (objectives 5a and 5b) and low density regions (objective 6).  Objective 
1 affected about 50 NUTS II level regions, and included the Mezzogiorno in Italy, all regions 
of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and about two third of the Spanish regions.  With regards to 
the type of projects financed, one third of structural funds (Ecu 77 billion at 1999 prices) 
were devoted to transportation infrastructures, while the rest supported human-capital 
enhancement and the productive sector directly.  Transportation infrastructures have also 
been strongly supported through one half of the cohesion funds (Ecu 8 billion at 1999 prices), 
the second main instrument of regional policies, allocated since 1994 to Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and Ireland.  They will not be formally included in the rest of the analysis since they 
                                                 
1   NUTS: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. The Commission uses as regional statistical concept 
the spatial classification established by Eurostat on the basis of national administrative units. Europe can 
therefore be shared either in 77 NUTS I level regions, or 211 NUTS II, 1031 NUTS III, 1074 NUTS IV or 
98433 NUTS V. Regional objectives are however mostly designated at either NUTS II or NUTS III level 
regions. 
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are allocated at the national but not regional level, and since there are no data to reveal their 
regional distribution.  For the European Commission, that has the goal of achieving the 
European Single Market, transportation infrastructures play a key role in the efforts to reduce 
the lack of cohesion among members.   
However, from a theoretical as well as empirical point of view, their impact on regional 
development is not clear.  On the one hand the endogenous growth models à la Aschauer 
(1989) and Barro (1990) predict that if public infrastructures are an input in the production 
function, then policies financing new public infrastructures increase the marginal product of 
private capital, fostering both capital accumulation and growth.  On the other hand, the 
economic geography theoretical perspectives developed by Martin and Rogers (1995) and 
Martin  (2000) demonstrate that when transportation infrastructures are financed, they affect 
the process of industry location and lead to involuntary effects.  Financing intra-regional 
transport infrastructures in the poorest regions increases the probability of firms locating 
there, but reduces the country’s aggregate growth rate and increases regional income 
inequalities. On the other hand, interregional transport infrastructures foster  aggregate 
growth, but lead to greater concentration in the core.  Moreover, an increasing part of the new 
transport infrastructures planed for the development of the trans-European network tend to be 
built within and between core regions, where transport demand is the highest (Vickerman, 
1991, 1996).  Only the regions that belong to the main network will gain in accessibility, 
whereas the regions that do not belong to it or are located at the edge of it will not.   
The relationship between gain in accessibility and economic development in peripheral 
regions is not clear and requires further research, since it depends on the specific dependence 
on transport cost in each sector.  There is no doubt that gains in accessibility due to 
interregional transport infrastructures will always be relatively higher in the core region than 
in the peripheral one (Vickerman et al., 1999; Venables and Gasiorek, 1999).  Peripheral 
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regions have generally lower unit costs than core regions and this advantage may attract 
activities to locate there.  However, this attraction also depends on the level of transport 
infrastructure, the lack of which impedes the development of growth potential in the 
periphery, but the improvement of which does not necessarily promote its growth. 
Three other points confirm that the allocation of regional funds does not necessarily promote 
regional development.  First, a firm located in the targeted region does not necessarily 
undertake the construction of new infrastructures.  As a result, a part of the value added of a 
project in one region may first benefit another location.  Secondly, beyond this apparent 
desire to reduce interregional income inequalities, the EU aid is not necessarily correlated 
with the development gap or development potential.  As pointed out by Fayolle and Lecuyer 
(2000), only objective 1 was devoted to the poorest regions.  Objectives 2 and 3, even if they 
handle lower amounts, concern aid for industry restructuring that affect mostly regions that 
were formerly prosperous.  Finally, a particular project is never implemented without 
additional regional or national financing.  This is the principle of additionality that would 
preclude regions presenting dubious projects4.  There is a bias introduced through this 
principle which comes from the fact that poor regions often have problems to match the 
European aid, whereas the aid can be tripled or quadrupled in regions with medium or high 
income levels, as they have more fiscal capacity to complement structural funds (Martin, 
1998).   
 
3 Data  
The regional per capita GDP series in Ecu current prices come from the database New 
Cronos Regio by Eurostat.  This is the official database used by the European Commission 
                                                 
4   Community funds support up to 75% of total public expenditure in NUTS regions, the rest depends on 
national or regional additionality in order to avoid regions present unviable projects.  The ceilings vary 
according to the objective concerned: objective 1 finances a maximum 75% of the total cost, but 80% in 
cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) and 85% in the most remote regions and the outlying 
Greek islands. The other objectives financed a maximum 50% of the total cost.  
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for its evaluation of regional convergence.  We use the logarithms of the per capita GDP of 
each region over the 1989-1999 period in constant prices.  Our sample is composed of 145 
regions at NUTS II level (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) over 12 EU 
countries:  
- Belgium: 11 regions 
- Denmark: 1 region 
- Germany: 30 regions.  Berlin and the nine former East German regions are excluded 
due to historical reasons 
- Greece: 13 regions 
- Spain: 16 regions, as we exclude the remote islands: Las Palmas, Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife Canary Islands and Ceuta y Mellila.  
- France: 22 regions 
- Ireland: 2 regions  
- Italy: 20 regions  
- Netherlands: 12 regions 
- Portugal: 5 regions.  The Azores and Madeira are excluded because of their 
geographical distance 
- United Kingdom: 12 regions.  In the case of the UK, we use regions at the NUTS I 
level, because NUTS II regions are not used as governmental units, they are merely 
statistical inventions of the EU Commission and the UK government. 
- Luxembourg: 1 region 
 
We do not include Austria, Finland and Sweden since they joined the EU only in 1995.  The 
choice of studying European regions at the NUTS II level is purely based on regional 
development policies consideration.  The data on structural funds come from the publications 
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of the Commission.  The period under study covers the two first programming periods: the 
data over 1989-1993 are from “Community structural interventions”, Statistical report n°3 
and 4,(July and Dec., 1992)5 and for 1994-1999, from The 11th annual report on the 
structural funds.  The data represent the total payments plus the total engagements of the 
European Commission at the date of publishing the 11th report.  Some of the funds were 
allocated to 6 German NUTS I regions and 2 Belgian NUTS I regions.  We therefore 
disaggregate these funds at the NUTS II level with respect to their objective and their 
redistribution pattern6.  With regard to the total cost of Community projects, we apply the 
same methodology and take also into account the fact that the richer NUTS 2 regions within 
the NUTS 1 region have more facility to accompany Community funds.  This modification 
enables the bias introduced by additional funds to be considered in the formal analysis.  Since 
these data are not annually available and we want to consider funds relatively to the local 
population, data are divided by the number of inhabitant (average over 1989-1999) for each 
region and expressed in constant prices.  As we have seen in the previous section, structural 
funds are just a part of the financing of public infrastructures in lagging regions.  Since 
national and regional co-financings also support Community investments, we will also 
consider the total cost of Community projects over the same period.  
We are aware that our empirical results could be affected by missing regions and by the use 
of different levels of spatial aggregation.  The choice of the spatial aggregation influences the 
magnitude of various measures of association.  In the literature, this problem is referred to the 
modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) (see Openshaw and Taylor, 1979), and also 
considered as an example of ecological fallacy (Anselin and Cho, 2000).  Messner and 
Anselin (2001) add that scale is important as well.  If the scale and spatial extent of units of 
observations for the data do not match up the scale and spatial extent of the studied process, 
                                                 
5   The author would like to thank Jacky Fayolle and Anne Lecuyer for providing this dataset. 
6   The disaggregating methodology is available upon request. 
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then it may result in a statistical problem wherein spatially correlated and/or heteroskedastic 
error structures occur.  For instance, the area of Castilla-y-Leon (in Spain) is 585 times 
greater than the one of Brussels (Belgium), but both are official NUTS II regions (Casellas 
and Galley, 1999).  Moreover, per capita growth in open formal NUTS 2 regions may reflect 
characteristics of neighboring regions.  Boldrin and Canova (2001) discuss the problems 
linked to measuring a variable on a territorial unit that is artificially defined and in which 
people are free to move.  They give the example of the city of Hamburg, a NUTS II level 
region with high per capita income, in which half the population of the whole Hamburg 
metropolitan area lives in the nearby NUTS II level regions of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower 
Saxony, commuting to Hamburg for work.  As a result, the value added in Hamburg is 
overstated by 20% relative to its effective population, while those of Schleswig-Holstein 
(value added equals 102% of EU average) and Lower Saxony (104%) are understated.  This 
is similar for Ile de France (160%) and Bassin Parisien (92.7%), Communidad de Madrid 
(101%) and its two neighboring Castillas (66 and 76%).   
 
4 Exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) 
ESDA is a set of techniques used to describe and visualize spatial distributions, identify 
atypical locations or spatial outliers, discover patterns of spatial association, clusters or hot 
spots, and suggest spatial regimes or other forms of spatial heterogeneity (Anselin, 1988, 
1999; Messner and Anselin, 2001; Haining, 1990) 
 
4.1- Mapping the distributions  
We start the analysis with the figure 17.  It is a choropleth map displaying the distribution of 
regional per capita GDP level in 1989 relative to the European average.  A clear core-
                                                 
7   All figures have been realized using ArcView GIS 3.2 (Esri). 
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periphery pattern appears in this map, with the core (the darker color) composed of the richest 
regions, whereas the peripheral regions are also the poorest ones.  Four different categories 
are presented.  The first one includes the regions of Ireland, Portugal, Greece, the majority of 
the Spanish regions and six southern Italian ones with per capita GDP below 75% of the 
European average in 1989 (objective 1).  The other categories show the distribution of 
regional income below the average but superior to 75% (75%-100%), higher than the average 
(100%-150%) and strongly greater than the average (>150%).  Three regions had an 
exceptionally greater level of income than the overall distribution (greater than 1.5 
interquartile ranges), thus are considered as outliers.  These are the regions of Hamburg and 
Darmstadt in Germany, and Ile-de-France in France.  These results are partly due to 
significant commuting from their neighboring regions, as was noted earlier for the case of 
Hamburg.   
<<insert figure 1 here>> 
The core-periphery pattern in 1999 is still apparent and since there have been few changes, a 
separate figure is not included.  Only the situation of the two Irish regions has clearly 
improved in comparison with the initial year.  Actually the Irish per capita GDP has been 
greater than the EU average since 1997.   
Figure 2 displays the distribution (in quartile) of the sum of structural funds on the average 
regional GDP over 1989-1999.  As expected, the poor and peripheral regions are the ones that 
benefited the most from Community support.  Note that two core regions (Hainaut in 
Belgium and Flevoland in Netherlands) belong to the most assisted regions as well.  They 
even received more structural assistance than Attiki (Greece) or some Portuguese or Spanish 
regions.  The explanation lies in the facts that the two regions received significant structural 
funds, but under objective 2 (for regions in industrial decline), whereas the poor Portuguese 
and Spanish regions received assistance only under objective 1.  As explained in section 2, 
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structural assistance is not only based on the objective of reducing income gaps.  We do not 
perform an analysis of detecting outliers since the map makes clear that the poor and 
peripheral regions received exceptionally high levels of structural funds compared to the 
sample mean.   
<<insert figure 2 here>> 
Figure 3 presents the ratio total project cost on structural funds (in quartile).  The greater is 
this ratio, the greater is the regional or national co-financing in the total investment.  In the 
poorest regions (first quartile), the total cost is until 2.2 times higher than the level of 
structural funds.  It means that the region itself has to pay an amount equal to 1.2 times the 
level of structural funds.  While peripheral regions are just able to double the Community 
support (first quartile), the wealthiest northern Spanish regions and numerous core regions 
succeed in providing from 2.5 to 6.4 times the amount committed by structural funds (upper 
quartile).   
<< insert figure 3 here>> 
The range of each category defined in the previous maps is rather large, and these maps do 
not allow reveal whether the spatial distribution of this variable is significantly persistent 
over the period.  Moreover, they are also limited in the ability to identify any of the 
significant spatial effects that were introduced in the introduction.   
 
4.2 Determination of the spatial weight matrix 
Before going further in the spatial analysis of regional income distribution, some comments 
need to be made about the spatial weight matrix that will be employed in the analysis.  In the 
European context, the presence of islands such as the United-Kingdom, Ireland or Corsica 
impedes adoption of simple contiguity matrices, since the weight matrix would include rows 
and columns with only zeros for these regions.  Since unconnected observations are 
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eliminated from the results of the global statistics, this would change the sample size and the 
interpretation of the statistical inference.  Following the recommendations of Anselin (1996) 
and Anselin and Bera (1998), we choose to base them on pure geographical distance, as the 
exogeneity of geographical distance is unambiguous8.  More precisely, we use the great circle 
distance between regional centroids.  By using the great circle distance, dependence can be 
considered in any direction.  Following Le Gallo and Ertur (2003), we base our weight 
matrices on the k = 10, 15, 20 nearest neighbors.  The form of the spatial weight matrix is the 
following: 
 
ij
ijij ij i ij ij
j
ij ij i
w (k)= 0  if  i = j
w (k)= 1  if  d D (k) and w (k)= w (k) w (k)            for k = 10,15,20
w (k)= 0  if  d > D (k)
∗
 ≤
∑                 (1) 
 
where ijd  is the great circle distance between centroids of region i and j. )k(Di  is the critical 
cut-off distance defined for each region i, above which interactions are assumed to be 
negligible.  In other words, )k(Di  is the 
thk  order smallest distance between regions i and j 
such that each region i has exactly k neighbors.  Each matrix is row standardized so that it is 
relative and not absolute distance that matters, yielding the matrix w
∗
.  It is worth mentioning 
that in the European context, the minimum number of nearest neighbors that guarantees 
international connections between all regions is k=7, otherwise the Greek regions would not 
be linked to Italy at all.  With k=10, Ireland is connected to the UK, which in turn is 
connected to the whole continent; and the islands of Sicilia, Sardegna, Corsica are connected 
                                                 
8   In the case of European regions, it could be attractive to base these weights on the channels of 
communication between regions, such as roads and railways (see Bodson and Peeters, 1975).  However, as 
pointed out by Anselin and Bera (1998), “indicators for the socioeconomic weights should be chosen with great 
care to ensure their exogeneity, unless their endogeneity is considered explicitly in the model specification”.   
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to the continental French regions.  When the number of k-nearest neighbors increases, the 
share of international interconnections increases as well.   
 
4.3- Moran’ I 
We begin the analysis of the spatial distribution of regional income and regional funds by 
examining Moran’s I statistics to capture the global spatial autocorrelation of the variables of 
interest.  For each variable, the degree of linear association between its value at one location 
and the spatially weighted average of neighboring values is provided.  We use a permutation 
approach with 10000 permutations (Anselin, 1995)9.  Formally, for each variable of interest, 
the Moran’s I is given by: 
 
1 1
1 1
( )
n n
ij it jt
i j
t n n
it jt
i j
w k x x
I
x x
∗
= =
= =
=
∑∑
∑∑
                                                                                                          (2) 
 
where ijw
∗
 is the (row-standardized) degree of connection between the spatial units i and j and 
itx  is the variable of interest in region i at year t (measured as a deviation from the mean 
value for that year).  Values of I larger (smaller) than the expected value )1n/(1)I(E −−=  
indicate positive (negative) spatial autocorrelation.  In our case, )I(E = -0.00694.   
<<insert table 1 here>> 
The results in table 1 report the value of Moran’s I and of the standard deviation for all the 
variables.10  Moran’s I statistics are positive and significant (p-value = 0.0001) for all 
variables.  For the regional per capita income, it means that the rich (poor) regions have a 
                                                 
9   We use the SpaceStat 1.91 software to realize all the computations (Anselin, 1999). 
10  The results are similar to those found with the Geary’s c statistics.  Complete results are available upon 
request. 
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propensity to be clustered close to other rich (poor) regions.  We note that the values of the 
statistics seem stable over the period, but they are higher over the 1993-1995 period, one that 
corresponds to greater integration after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.  The distribution of the 
regional per capita GDP in Europe is therefore certainly not random.  With the same idea, 
objective (non-objective) regions, i.e. regions with high (low) structural funds, have a 
propensity to be close to other objective (non-objective) regions.  The extent of Moran’s I 
statistics reveals a higher clustering of regions with similar structural funds than with similar 
Community projects, for all weight matrices.  Differences among values of Community 
projects seem smaller than among structural funds according to the standard deviation as 
well.  One explanation is that the last ones have structural purposes, therefore their amount 
and location are targeted.  On the contrary, the first ones depend more on national/regional 
contributions that easily complement Community support in the rich regions.  Results also 
display a clustering of regions with high (slow) growth rates.  The Moran’s I can detect 
global spatial autocorrelation, but it is not able to identify local patterns of spatial association, 
such as local spatial clusters or local spatial outliers of high (low) values that are statistically 
significant.  Identifying the groups of regions belonging to clustering of high (low) values of 
per capita income is based on the results of a Moran scatterplot.   
 
4.4 Moran’s scatterplot 
The idea of the Moran scatterplot, suggested by Anselin (1996), is to display the per capita 
income for each region (on the horizontal axis) against the standardized spatial weighted 
average (average of the neighbors’ per capita income, also called spatial lag) on the vertical 
axis.  As pointed out by Anselin (1999), expressing the variables in standardized form (i.e. 
with mean zero and standard deviation equal to one) allows assessment of both the global 
spatial association, since the slope of the line is the Moran’s I coefficient, and local spatial 
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association (the quadrant in the scatterplot).  The Moran scatterplot is therefore divided into 
four different quadrants corresponding to the four types of local spatial association between a 
region and its neighbors: 
- quadrant I (on the top right corner) displays the regions with a high per capita income 
(above the average) surrounded by regions with high per capita income (above the 
average).  This quadrant is usually noted HH. 
- quadrant II (on the top left corner) shows the regions with low value surrounded by 
regions with high values.  This quadrant is usually noted LH. 
- quadrant III (on the bottom left) displays the regions with low value surrounded by 
regions with low values, and is noted LL. 
- quadrant IV (on the bottom right) shows the regions with high value surrounded by 
regions with low values.  It is noted HL. 
Regions located in quadrants I and III refer to positive spatial autocorrelation,  the spatial 
clustering of similar values, whereas quadrants II and IV represent negative spatial 
autocorrelation, the spatial clustering of dissimilar values.   
<<insert figure 4 >> 
Figure 4 displays the Moran scatterplots of regional per capita GDP for 1989, with k= 10 
nearest neighbors.  Positive spatial autocorrelation, detected by the value of Moran’s I, is 
reflected by the fact that most of the regions are located in quadrant I and III.  Compared to 
the situation in the final period11, most of the regions that belong to quadrant I (III) in 1989 
also belong to quadrant I (III) in 1999.  However, there are some exceptions such as the two 
Irish regions that were LL at the initial year and are HH (Dublin) or LH (Border) at the final 
year.  This reflects the rapid development of Ireland over the decade.  Other signs of 
                                                 
11   Complete results available upon request. 
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development concern three Belgian regions (Luxembourg, Brabant-Wallon, Antwerpen) and 
Yorkshire and the Humber (UK) which go from LH-type to HH-type.  
On the contrary, signs of decline may be seen in one Italian region (Abruzzo) that moves 
from HH-type to LL-type, Picardie (France), Trier and Lüneburg (Germany) and Drenthe 
(Netherlands) that move from HH- to LH-type.  The Moran scatterplot also enables 
identification of regions with higher spatial instability for both years (HL-type and LH–type): 
Aquitaine in France (HL), whereas Corse, Languedoc-Roussillon, Limousin (France), Wales, 
North-East (UK), Namur, Hainaut (Belgium), Flevoland and Friesland (Netherlands) are LH-
type.  This implies that the spatial distribution of regional income is more complicated that 
the simple core-periphery framework previously noticed in the choropleth maps.  Le Gallo 
and Ertur (2003) reached the same conclusions for 138 European regions over 1980-1995. 
The same method is applied to structural funds and Community projects total costs as well.  
The results for structural funds are presented in figure 5.  Here again, most of the regions are 
located in quadrants I and III.  Regions in I (III) are basically the regions that were in III (I) in 
figure 4, reflecting the efforts at promoting cohesion by the Commission.  However, the 
regions Madrid (Spain), Norte and Lisboa and Vale do Tejo (Portugal) were LL-type for their 
income in 1989 and 1999, but are LH for both structural funds and Community funds because 
they are among the richest of the Iberian Peninsula.  The region of Dublin in Ireland is by far 
the first beneficiary of the allocation of structural funds and Community projects (it is not 
displayed in the figure).  To a lesser extent, this is also true for the Greek region Voreio 
Aigaio and the Spanish Extremadura.   
<<insert figure 5>> 
The last three columns of table 2 present the scatterplot quadrants for total structural funds 
over the average income 89-99, Community projects total costs over the average income 89-
99 and additional funds.  The results for additional funds confirm that the rich regions are 
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more able to complement structural funds whereas the poor ones cannot.  In Spain for 
instance, the regions of Navarra, La Rioja and Cataluña have signifiant additions to the 
Community funds, which may be a reason for increasing disparities among Spanish regions 
(Fayolle and Lecuyer, 2000).  
<<insert table 2>> 
 
4.5 LISA (Local Indicator of Spatial Association) 
The previous scatterplots display a slight modification of the overall structure of spatial 
autocorrelation between the initial and the final year.  For instance, some regions that were 
HH in the initial year belong to another quadrant in the final year.  We therefore calculate 
LISA statistics for each observation to obtain an indication of the extent to which there has 
been significant spatial clustering of similar values around that observation.  Moreover, the 
sum of LISAs for all observations is proportional to a global indicator of spatial association 
(Anselin, 1995).  Since we use a row-standardized matrix, the average of local Moran 
statistics is equal to the global Moran’s I statistics.  LISA statistics are used for the detection 
of significant local spatial clusters (also called “hot spots”) as well as for the diagnostics of 
local instability, significant outliers and spatial regimes.  Anselin (1995) formalized the local 
Moran’s statistics for each region i and year t in the following way: 
0
it
ijit jt
j
xI w x
m
∗ =   ∑   with 20 /itim x n=∑                                                                           (3) 
with itx  ( jtx ) is the observation in region i (j) at year t (measured as a deviation from the 
mean value for that year).  The results from the application of LISA with k= 10 nearest 
neighbors are summarized in columns three to seven of table 2.  The robustness of these 
results is revealed in tables 3 and 4 with k=15 and 20 neighbors respectively.  The 
significance level is based on a conditional permutation approach with 10000 random 
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permutations of the neighboring regions for each observation (Anselin, 1995).  The pseudo-
significance level is 5%.  However, due to a problem of multiple statistical comparisons, 
since the neighborhood sets of two regions may contain common regions (Ord and Getis 
1995; Anselin, 1995), we follow the methodology of Le Gallo and Ertur (2003) and present 
also in column 8 the number of years for which the results are significant at a 5% Bonferroni 
pseudo-significance level (= 5% over 10 since we use the 10 nearest-neighbors).   
In columns three to seven of table 2, each cell displays the number of years the significant 
local Moran statistics is located in a particular Moran scatterplot quadrant.  The regions 
revealing significant and greater spatial association of per capita GDP (HH or LL) are 
basically those previously detected as core (HH cluster) and peripheral (LL cluster) regions.  
Over the period, 97% of the local statistics that are significant are either HH- or LL-type, 
reflecting the global trend of positive spatial association.  However, not all core/peripheral 
regions cluster significantly over the period.  Local Moran statistics are not significant over 
the period for various regions in different countries (column 3 in table 2).  Denmark, Greece 
and Portugal are the only countries without any non-significant statistics throughout the 
period (in Germany, Düsseldorf is the only region displaying non-significant statistics).  
Regions displaying positive local spatial association throughout the 11 years can be identified 
as follows: 
- two different HH-type clusters can be identified because they are distant from each other: 
- all the German regions (but Düsseldorf), Denmark, four northern French 
regions (Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté), four southern Belgian 
regions (Antwerpen, Luxembourg, Limburg and Vlaams-Brabant), and four southern Dutch 
regions (Zuid-Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant and Limburg). 
- six Italian regions (Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto 
Adige, Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia).  
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- two different LL-type clusters can also be identified for the same reason : 
- all the Portuguese regions and eleven Spanish regions (Galicia, Asturias, 
Cantabria, Madrid, Castilla-y-Léon, Castilla-la-Mancha, Extremadura, Communidad 
Valenciana, Baléares, Andalucia and Murcia) 
- all the Greek regions and four southern Italian regions (Puglia, Basilicata, 
Calabria, Sicilia).  
All of them show positive spatial autocorrelation with a significance level p <0.05 for more 
than 5 years.  The persistence of different clusters of high and low income is a sign of spatial 
heterogeneity among European regions confirming the persistence of income disparities.  
These results are robust when we use k=15 or 20 neighbors, confirmed by the robustness 
analysis for LISA (suggested by Le Gallo and Ertur, 2003) displayed in tables 3 and 4.  
Significant negative spatial autocorrelation occurs over 10 years for the French region of 
Corsica (LH-type), but no more than three years elsewhere.  Two interpretations can be noted 
from these tables.  First, when we increase the number of neighbors, a region with a 
significant LISA remains in the same quadrant.  Secondly, respectively 21.9% and 31.6% of 
the regions with non significant LISA for k=10 become HH-type when k= 15 and k=20.  
These regions are mostly French, North-Italian, Belgian, Dutch and British, whereas the 
regions becoming LL-type (4.6% when k= 15 and 4.5% when k=20) are mostly Spanish and 
Southern Italian. 
<<insert tables 3 and 4 here>> 
If we focus now on the column giving the significant Moran scatterplot quadrants for growth 
over 1989-1999, the significant HH-type correlation applies to all the Portuguese and Irish 
regions, the Greek regions (except Ipeiros and Sterea Ellada), only Extremadura in Spain and 
five British regions.  Only three regions have a significant Moran statistic in Spain, which can 
be explained by the fact that Spain is the country where regional inequities have increased the 
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most over this period.  The LL-growth-type regions are Italian (except Calabria and Puglia), 
ten French regions, mostly in the South, six German regions (Tübingen, Freiburg, Karlsruhe, 
Rheinhessen-Pflaz, Darmstadt and Arnsberg) and Baleares in Spain.  Six regions show 
significant negative spatial autocorrelation: Andalucia and Galicia in Spain, Sterea Ellada in 
Greece are LH-type, which indicates that they failed to develop in spite of the dynamism of 
their neighboring regions.  On the other hand, three HL-type regions (Corse in France, 
Gießen and Kassel in Germany) show a significantly higher dynamism than their neighbors.   
<<insert table 5 here>> 
Table 5 is a correlation table between the initial per capita income and the growth rate over 
the period.  Only 27% of the results are significant for both initial per capita income and 
growth rate.  However, it is interesting to note that 82% of these results show an inverse 
relationship between initial conditions and growth rates.  The five Portuguese regions, nine 
out of thirteen Greek regions (the others do not have significant results) and Extremadura in 
Spain were LL-type for their initial income, but were HH-type for their growth rate over 
1989-1999.  Among the significant results, the conditions of β -convergence seem respected 
since the poor regions also have the highest growth rates.  The Irish and Spanish regions do 
not appear here since the results for initial income are not significant in Ireland, and most of 
the results for growth are not significant in Spain.  On the contrary, the regions displaying 
significant HH-type for the initial income and significant LL-type for growth are six German 
regions (Karlsruhe, Freiburg, Tübingen, Darmstadt, Arnsberg, Rheinhessen-Pflaz), three 
French regions (Alsace, Franche-Comté, Provence-Alpes-Cote-d’Azur), nine northern Italian 
regions (Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-
Venezia Giula, Emilio-Romagna).  Three regions, Gießen and Kassel in Germany and Corse 
in France (but only in 1989) were HH-type for the initial income and HL-type for growth.  
The two German regions have therefore succeeded in growing faster than their neighbors, in 
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spite of a high initial level of income, like their neighbors.  Three regions (Galicia and 
Andalucia in Spain and Sterea Ellada in Greece) are significantly LL-type for their initial 
income but LH-type for their growth.  It means that even if these regions started with the 
same initial conditions as their neighbors, their neighbors performed better in terms of 
development.   
Instead of describing the significant results for LISA statistics on regional funds presented in 
the last three columns of table 2, the last step of our analysis will focus directly on the 
correlation between structural funds (then additional funds) and regional growth presented in 
table 6.   
<<insert table 6 here>> 
Only 28% of the results are significant for both structural funds and growth.  However, 78% 
of these results show a positive relationship between growth and structural funds.  Fourteen 
regions characterized by significant HH-type structural funds show significant HH-type 
growth.  These regions are nine Greek regions (see table 2), Dublin in Ireland, three 
Portuguese regions (Centro, Alentejo and Algarve) and Northern Ireland (UK).  On the 
contrary, the regions with LL-type growth and LL-type structural funds are six German 
regions (Karlsruhe, Freiburg, Tübingen, Damrstadt, Arnsberg, Rheinhessen-Pflaz), five 
French regions (Alsace, Franche-Comté, Poitou-Chatentes, Limousin, Auvergne), six Italian 
regions (Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino-Alo Adige, Veneto, Fruili Veneza 
Giulia) and Luxembourg (country).   
The atypical patterns of growth-structural funds relationships for regions with a different 
development behavior than their neighbors, in spite of the fact that they all are “similarly” 
assisted.12  For instance, Gießen and Kassel (Germany) are LL-type for structural funds, but 
HL-type for growth.  They performed better than their neighbors, in spite of a similar low 
                                                 
12   We put this word into quotation marks because the per capita levels of regional assistance may be very 
different, even if they belong to the same quadrant in the Moran scatterplot. 
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level of structural funds.  Norte and Liboa e Vale do Tejo in Portugal and Scotland (UK) are 
also insightful since they are HH-type growth but LH-type structural funds.  On the contrary, 
Galicia, Andalucia (Spain) and Sterea Ellada (Greece) do not grow as fast as their neighbors, 
even if they received “similar” structural assistance (LH growth, HH funds). 
Clearly, structural funds are not the main variable driving even/uneven regional development.  
A closer look at the economic structure, the accessibility, the institutional aspects of each 
region as well as the type of projects that structural funds finance in these regions and their 
neighboring regions could help explain why these regions display greater/smaller 
development progress than their neighbors even if they receive similar amount of structural 
funds.   
Further, the perpetuation of disparities may be attributed in part to a region’s ability to 
provide additional, matching funds.  Again, the correlation displays that regions with low 
additional funds (the poor ones since they cannot afford additional investment) have a HH-
type growth and inversely13.  An interesting case is for the three regions that display 
significant LH-type for growth and LL-type for additional funds: Sterea Ellada in Greece, 
Andalucia and Galicia in Spain.  Remember that these regions are HH-type for structural 
funds.  Therefore, if they do not perform as well as at their neighbors in terms of 
development, the reason does not come from higher additional funds in neighboring regions.  
Once again, a closer look at the specific economic structure of these regions as well as the use 
of regional funds could help to clarify the presence of “atypical” linkages between growth 
and structural funds detected in table 6. 
 
                                                 
13   Complete results upon request. 
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5 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to perform an exploratory analysis of the ability of the 
European Commission to reduce regional disparities through its regional policy.  We have 
investigated relationships between the spatial distribution of per capita GDP and of regional 
funds of 145 European regions over 1989-1999, using an exploratory spatial data analysis.  
This period corresponds to the two first program periods wherein regional assistance to the 
poorest regions was made available.  We first used Moran’s I to detect the presence of 
positive global spatial autocorrelation in the distribution of per capita GDP to explore 
whether the rich (poor) regions have a propensity to be clustered close to other rich (poor) 
regions.  Global spatial autocorrelation also characterizes the regional growth rate, structural 
funds and Community projects total costs.  Further analysis using Moran’s scatterplot reveals 
also the presence of positive local spatial autocorrelation for each of the previous variables.   
When LISA is performed, the results confirm the significant presence and persistence over 
time of local spatial autocorrelation in the form of two distinct spatial clusters of high and 
low values of per capita income.  This form of spatial heterogeneity reflects a core-periphery 
pattern since per capita GDP inequalities are persistent among European regions.  LISA is 
also performed on the spatial distribution of the regional growth rate.  When an exploratory 
investigation of the correlation between the spatial patterns of the variables is performed, a 
negative relationship between regional growth and initial income level is detected among the 
significant results, a finding that seems consistent with the hypothesis of β -convergence.  A 
positive relationship between regional growth and structural funds is also identified among 
the significant results.  It may reflect the distributional efforts of the European Commission 
that has devoted the most important part of its funds to help the least developed regions and 
therefore provides little assistance to the rich regions.  However, the results also indicate that 
structural funds are clearly not the only variable to control for the various growth rates among 
 
24
European regions.  This is confirmed by the presence of “atypical” linkages between both 
variables in  Andalucia, Galicia and Sterea Ellada.  These results show that studies of 
European regional development should take into account the level of structural funds devoted 
to the objective region itself, but also to its neighboring regions.  However, given the 
exploratory nature of our analysis, this paper calls for a thorough mutli-regional estimation of 
the workings of the system involved.  In the absence of interregional input-output tables in 
Europe, this could be done, for example, using  a spatial econometric estimation where 
spatial effects, initial conditions and the spatial distribution of both structural funds and 
Community projects total costs would be included in the estimation of the European regional 
convergence process.  While this need is important for a better understanding of the impact of 
regional funds on cohesion, this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Figure 1: Spatial distribution of regional per capita GDP relative to the European average in 1989 
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Figure 2: Structural funds divided by the mean regional GDP 1989-1999 
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Figure 3: Additional funds: total costs/structural funds over 1989-1999 
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Figure 4: Moran scatterplot of regional per capita GDP in 1989 
  Note: See table 2 for the region’s name corresponding to each code 
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Figure 5: Moran scatterplot of total structural funds relative to region’s average GDP 
Note 1: Out of the figure is the Irish region Border (HL-type) of which coordinates are (8.252, -0.016) 
Note 2: The codes of the regions located in the LL-quadrant are not displayed for facilitating the reading 
(complete results are available in table 2) 
 
 
Table 1: Moran’s I statistics and standard deviation 
 10 neighbors 15 neighbors 20 neighbors 
GDP 1989 0.7453 (0.0337) 0.6787 (0.0265) 0.5921 (0.0223) 
GDP 1990 0.7502 (0.0337) 0.6828 (0.0265) 0.5920 (0.0223) 
GDP 1991 0.7378 (0.0337) 0.6706 (0.0265) 0.5795 (0.0223) 
GDP 1992 0.7562 (0.0336) 0.6932 (0.0265) 0.6043 (0.0223) 
GDP 1993 0.7776 (0.0336) 0.7308 (0.0265) 0.6600 (0.0223) 
GDP 1994 0.7855 (0.0336) 0.7429 (0.0265) 0.6762 (0.0224) 
GDP 1995 0.7864 (0.0336) 0.7502 (0.0266) 0.6904 (0.0224) 
GDP 1996 0.7577 (0.0336) 0.7180 (0.0266) 0.6532 (0.0224) 
GDP 1997 0.7209 (0.0337) 0.6868 (0.0265) 0.6251 (0.0224) 
GDP 1998 0.7166 (0.0337) 0.6815 (0.0265) 0.6188 (0.0224) 
GDP 1999 0.6984 (0.0336) 0.6654 (0.0265) 0.6054 (0.0224) 
FS/M 0.2932 (0.0294) 0.2785 (0.0236) 0.2529 (0.0198) 
CT/M 0.1995 (0.0271) 0.1836 (0.0217) 0.1722 (0.0182) 
GROWTH 0.4411 (0.0335) 0.3454 (0.0267) 0.2387 (0.0225) 
Note: Standard deviations are into brackets.  All statistics are significant at p= 0.0001.  Computations are based 
on 10000 random permutations.  FS/M is total structural funds 89-99 over region’s GDP average in 1989-1999; 
CT/M is Community projects total costs 89-99 over region’s GDP average in 1989-1999. 
 
 
31
Table 2: Local spatial autocorrelation 
Code Region Not sign HH LL HL LH 
Bonf. 
5% 
growth 
89-99 Regions fs/m ct/m ct/fs
 Belgium        Belgium    
BE1 Brussels 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns Brussels LL LL LH*
BE21 Antwerpen 4 7 0 0 0 0 ns Antwerpen LL LL HH*
BE22 Limburg 5 6 0 0 0 0 ns Limburg LL LL HH*
BE23 Oost-Vlaanderen 8 3 0 0 0 0 ns Oost-Vlaanderen LL LL HH*
BE24 Vlaams Brabant 5 6 0 0 0 0 ns Vlaams Brabant LL LL HH*
BE25 West-Vlaanderen 8 3 0 0 0 0 ns West-Vlaanderen LL LL HH*
BE31 Brabant Wallon 5 5 0 0 1 0 ns Brabant Wallon LL LL LH*
BE32 Hainaut 8 0 0 0 3 0 ns Hainaut HL HL HH*
BE33 Liège 7 4 0 0 0 0 ns Liège LL LL HH*
BE34 Luxembourg 4 7 0 0 0 0 ns Luxembourg LL LL LH*
BE35 Namur 8 1 0 0 2 0 ns Namur LL LL* LH*
 Germany        Germany    
DE11 Stuttgart 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Stuttgart LL LL HH 
DE12 Karlsruhe 0 11 0 0 0 11 LL Karlsruhe LL LL HH 
DE13 Freiburg 0 11 0 0 0 11 LL Freiburg LL LL HH 
DE14 Tübingen 0 11 0 0 0 11 LL Tübingen LL LL HH 
DE21 Oberbayern 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Oberbayern LL LL HH 
DE22 Niederbayern 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Niederbayern LL LL HH 
DE23 Oberpfalz 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Oberpfalz LL LL HH 
DE24 Oberfranken 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Oberfranken LL LL HH 
DE25 Mittelfranken 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Mittelfranken LL LL HH 
DE26 Unterfranken 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Unterfranken LL LL HH 
DE27 Schwaben 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Schwaben LL LL HH 
DE5 Bremen 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Bremen LL LL HH*
DE6 Hamburg 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Hamburg LL LL LH*
DE71 Darmstadt 0 11 0 0 0 11 LL Darmstadt LL LL HH 
DE72 Gießen 0 11 0 0 0 11 HL Gießen LL LL LH 
DE73 Kassel 0 11 0 0 0 11 HL Kassel LL LL HH 
DE91 Braunschweig 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Braunschweig LL LL HH*
DE92 Hannover 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Hannover LL LL HL*
DE93 Lüneburg 0 8 0 0 3 11 ns Lüneburg LL LL LL* 
DE94 Weser-Ems 0 11 0 0 0 4 ns Weser-Ems LL LL HH*
DEA1 Düsseldorf 9 2 0 0 0 1 ns Düsseldorf LL LL HH*
DEA2 Köln 0 11 0 0 0 2 ns Köln LL LL HH*
DEA3 Münster 0 11 0 0 0 0 ns Münster LL LL LH*
DEA4 Detmold 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Detmold LL LL HL*
DEA5 Arnsberg 0 11 0 0 0 11 LL Arnsberg LL LL HH*
DEB1 Koblenz 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Koblenz LL LL HH*
DEB2 Trier 0 9 0 0 2 2 ns Trier LL LL LH*
DEB3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz 0 11 0 0 0 11 LL 
Rheinhessen-  
Pfalz LL LL HH 
DEC Saarland 0 11 0 0 0 3 ns Saarland LL LL LH 
DEF Schleswig-Holstein 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns 
Schleswig-
Holstein LL LL LH*
DK Denmark 0 11 0 0 0 11 ns Denmark LL LL HH*
 Spain        Spain    
ES11 Galicia 0 0 11 0 0 11 LH Galicia HH HH* LL 
ES12 Asturias 0 0 11 0 0 11 ns Asturias HH* HH* LL 
ES13 Cantabria 2 0 9 0 0 0 ns Cantabria HH* HH* LL* 
ES21 Pais Vasco 7 0 4 0 0 0 ns Pais Vasco HH* HH* HL*
ES22 Navarra 10 0 1 0 0 0 ns Navarra LH* HH* HH*
ES23 La Rioja 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns La Rioja LH* HH* HL*
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 Region Not sign HH LL HL LH 
Bonf. 
5% 
growth 
89-99 Regions fs/m ct/m ct/fs
ES24 Aragón 10 0 1 0 0 0 ns Aragón HH* HH* LH*
ES3 Comunidad de Madrid 0 0 9 2 0 6 ns 
Comunidad de 
Madrid LH LH LL* 
ES41 Castilla y León 0 0 11 0 0 6 ns Castilla y León HH* HH* LL* 
ES42 Castilla-la Mancha 0 0 11 0 0 5 ns Castilla-la Mancha HH* HH* LL* 
ES43 Extremadura 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Extremadura HH* HH* LL 
ES51 Cataluña 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns Cataluña LL* HH* HH*
ES52 Comunidad Valenciana 4 0 7 0 0 0 ns 
Comunidad 
Valenciana HH* HH* LH*
ES53 Baleares 0 0 11 0 0 0 LL Baleares LL* LH* HH*
ES61 Andalucia 0 0 11 0 0 11 LH Andalucia HH HH* LL 
ES62 Murcia 1 0 10 0 0 5 ns Murcia HH* HH* LL* 
 France        France    
FR1 Ile de France 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns Ile de France LL* LL* HH*
FR21 Champagne- Ardenne 10 1 0 0 0 0 ns 
Champagne-  
Ardenne LL* LL* HH*
FR22 Picardie 3 5 0 0 3 0 ns Picardie LL LL* HH*
FR23 Haute-Normandi 8 3 0 0 0 0 ns Haute-Normandie LL LL* HH*
FR24 Centre 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL Centre LL* LL* HH*
FR25 Basse-Normandi 6 5 0 0 0 0 ns Basse-Normandie LL LL HL 
FR26 Bourgogne 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns Bourgogne LL LL HH*
FR3 Nord - Pas- de-Calais 0 11 0 0 0 0 ns 
Nord – Pas - de-
Calais LL LL* LH*
FR41 Lorraine 1 10 0 0 0 0 ns Lorraine LL LL LH*
FR42 Alsace 0 11 0 0 0 7 LL Alsace LL LL HH 
FR43 Franche-Comté 0 11 0 0 0 3 LL Franche-Comté LL LL HH*
FR51 Pays de la Loire 6 5 0 0 0 0 ns Pays de la Loire LL LL LH*
FR52 Bretagne 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns Bretagne LL LL LL* 
FR53 Poitou-Charentes 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL Poitou-Charentes LL LL* HH*
FR61 Aquitaine 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns Aquitaine LL* LH* HH 
FR62 Midi-Pyrénées 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL Midi-Pyrénées LL* LL* HH 
FR63 Limousin 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL Limousin LL HL* HH*
FR71 Rhône-Alpes 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL Rhône-Alpes LL* LL* HH*
FR72 Auvergne 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL Auvergne LL LL* HH*
FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL 
Languedoc-
Roussillon LL* LL* HH 
FR82 Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 10 1 0 0 0 0 LL 
Provence-Alpes-
Côte d'Azur LL* LL* LH*
FR83 Corse 0 1 0 0 10 0 HL Corse HL* HL* LL* 
 Greece        Greece    
GR11 
Anatoliki 
Makedonia, 
Thraki 
0 0 11 0 0 11 HH 
Anatoliki 
Makedonia, 
Thraki 
HH HH* LL 
GR12 Kentriki Makedonia 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH 
Kentriki 
Makedonia HH HH LL 
GR13 Dytiki Makedonia 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH 
Dytiki 
Makedonia HH HH LL 
GR14 Thessalia 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Thessalia HH HH LL 
GR21 Ipeiros 0 0 11 0 0 11 ns Ipeiros HH HH* LL 
GR22 Ionia Nisia 0 0 11 0 0 11 ns Ionia Nisia HH HH* LL 
GR23 Dytiki Ellada 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Dytiki Ellada HH HH* LL 
GR24 Sterea Ellada 0 0 11 0 0 11 LH Sterea Ellada HH HH* LL 
GR25 Peloponnisos 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Peloponnisos HH HH* LL 
GR3 Attiki 0 0 11 0 0 11 ns Attiki LH LH LL 
GR41 Voreio Aigaio 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Voreio Aigaio HH HH* LL 
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 Region Not sign HH LL HL LH 
Bonf. 
5% 
growth 
89-99 Regions fs/m ct/m ct/fs
GR42 Notio Aigaio 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Notio Aigaio HH HH* LL 
GR43 Kriti 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Kriti HH HH* LL 
 Ireland        Ireland    
IE01 Border 11 0 0 0 0 0 HH Border HH* HH* LL* 
IE02 Dublin 11 0 0 0 0 0 HH Dublin HH HH LL* 
 Italy        Italy    
IT11 Piemonte 0 11 0 0 0 4 LL Piemonte LL LL HH 
IT12 Valle d'Aosta 1 10 0 0 0 0 LL Valle d'Aosta LL LL LH 
IT13 Liguria 7 4 0 0 0 0 LL Liguria LL* LH* HH*
IT2 Lombardia 1 10 0 0 0 4 LL Lombardia LL LL HH 
IT31 Trentino-Alto Adige 0 11 0 0 0 10 LL 
Trentino-Alto 
Adige LL LL HH 
IT32 Veneto 1 10 0 0 0 4 LL Veneto LL LL* HH 
IT33 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0 11 0 0 0 4 LL 
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia LL LL* HH 
IT4 Emilia-Romagna 7 4 0 0 0 0 LL Emilia-Romagna LL* LL* LH*
IT51 Toscana 7 4 0 0 0 0 LL Toscana LL* LH* HH*
IT52 Umbria 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL Umbria HL* HL* LL* 
IT53 Marche 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL Marche LL* LH* HL*
IT6 Lazio 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL Lazio LH* LH* LL* 
IT71 Abruzzo 11 0 0 0 0 0 LL Abruzzo LH* HH* LL* 
IT72 Molise 10 0 1 0 0 0 LL Molise HH* HH* LL* 
IT8 Campania 6 0 5 0 0 0 LL Campania HH* LH* LL* 
IT91 Puglia 0 0 11 0 0 6 ns Puglia HH HH* LL 
IT92 Basilicata 4 0 7 0 0 1 LL Basilicata HH* HH* LL 
IT93 Calabria 0 0 11 0 0 10 ns Calabria HH HH* LL 
ITA Sicilia 4 0 7 0 0 1 LL Sicilia HH* HH* LL 
ITB Sardegna 10 0 0 0 1 0 LL Sardegna HL* HH* LL* 
LU Luxembourg 10 1 0 0 0 0 LL Luxembourg LL LL HL*
 Netherlands        Netherlands    
NL11 Groningen 10 1 0 0 0 0 ns Groningen LL LL* HH 
NL12 Friesland 10 1 0 0 0 0 ns Friesland LL LL* HH 
NL13 Drenthe 7 4 0 0 0 0 ns Drenthe LL LL* LH 
NL21 Overijssel 9 2 0 0 0 0 ns Overijssel LL LL* HH 
NL22 Gelderland 10 1 0 0 0 0 ns Gelderland LL LL* HH 
NL23 Flevoland 9 0 0 0 2 0 ns Flevoland HL HL HH 
NL31 Utrecht 10 1 0 0 0 0 ns Utrecht LL LL* HH 
NL32 Noord-Holland 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns Noord-Holland LL LL* HH 
NL33 Zuid-Holland 4 7 0 0 0 0 ns Zuid-Holland LL LL HH 
NL34 Zeeland 4 7 0 0 0 0 ns Zeeland LL LL HH*
NL41 Noord-Brabant 5 6 0 0 0 0 ns Noord-Brabant LL LL* HH 
NL42 Limburg 4 7 0 0 0 0 ns Limburg LL LL* HH 
 Portugal        Portugal    
PT11 Norte 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Norte LH LH* LL 
PT12 Centro 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Centro HH LH* LL 
PT13 Lisboa e Vale doTejo 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH 
Lisboa e Vale do
Tejo LH LH* LL 
PT14 Alentejo 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Alentejo HH HH* LL 
PT15 Algarve 0 0 11 0 0 11 HH Algarve HH HH* LL 
 United-Kingdom        United-Kingdom    
UKC North East 11 0 0 0 0 0 HH North East LL HL LL* 
UKK South West 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns South West LL* LL* LL* 
UKL Wales 11 0 0 0 0 0 HH Wales LL* LH* LL 
UKM Scotland 11 0 0 0 0 0 HH Scotland LH LH LL 
UKN Northern Ireland 11 0 0 0 0 0 HH Northern Ireland HH HH LL* 
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 Region Not sign HH LL HL LH 
Bonf. 
5% 
growth 
89-99 Regions fs/m ct/m ct/fs
UKD North West 11 0 0 0 0 0 HH North West LL* LL* HL 
UKE Yorkshire and thHumber 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns 
Yorkshire and the
Humber LL* LL LL* 
UKF East Midlands 11 0 0 0 0 0 HH East Midlands LL* LL* LL* 
UKG West Midlands 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns West Midlands LL LL LL* 
UKH Eastern 9 2 0 0 0 0 ns Eastern LL LL LL* 
UKI London 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns London LL LL LL* 
UKJ South East 11 0 0 0 0 0 ns South East LL LL LL* 
Note: Level of pseudo-significance p<0.05.  Not sign. denotes the number of years local statistics is not 
significant at 0.05.  Maximum number of years is 11.  HH, number of years local statistics of significant and in 
quadrant HH of Moran’s scatterplot; LL, number of years local statistics of significant and in quadrant LL of 
Moran’s scatterplot; HL, number of years local statistics of significant and in quadrant HL of Moran’s 
scatterplot; LH, number of years local statistics of significant and in quadrant LH of Moran’s scatterplot. Bonf. 
5% indicates the number of years the statistics is significant at 5% Bonferroni pseudo-significance level. 
Growth 89-99 indicates if local statistics of growth rate over 1989-1999 is significant or not, if yes, then the 
quadrant in Moran’s scatterplot it belongs to.  ns means no significance at p<0.05.  fs/m is total structural funds 
89-99 divided by the region’s mean per capita GDP over 1989-1999; ct/m is Community projects total costs 89-
99 divided by the region’s mean per capita GDP over 1989-1999; ct/fs is Community projects total costs 
divided by structural funds over 1989-1999, * indicates that the LISA statistics is not significant at the 5% 
pseudo-significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Robustness analysis for LISA from 10 to 15 neighbors 
              K=15 
K=10 
Not Sign. HH LL HL LH 
Not Sign. 67.8% 21.9% 4.6% 0.1% 5.6% 
HH 1.8% 98.0% 0% 0% 0.2% 
LL 6.2% 0% 93.8% 0% 0% 
HL 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
LH 29.6% 0% 0% 0% 70.4% 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Robustness analysis for LISA from 10 to 20 neighbors 
              K=20 
K=10 
Not Sign. HH LL HL LH 
Not Sign. 54.8% 31.6% 4.5% 0% 9.1% 
HH 1.5% 98.3% 0% 0% 0.2% 
LL 5.3% 0% 94.7% 0% 0% 
HL 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
LH 25.9% 0% 0% 0% 74.1% 
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Table 5: Correlation table of growth rate (1989-1999) by initial per capita GDP (1989)  
 Per capita GDP 1989 
Growth 
rate 
Not 
Sign. HH LL HL LH Sum 
Not Sign. 40 29 11 0 0 80 
HH 8 0 
Extremadura (ES), Anatoliki Makedonia 
(GR), Kentriki Makedonia (GR), Dytiki 
Makedonia (GR), Thessalia (GR), Dytiki 
Ellada (GR), Peloponnisos (GR), Voreio 
Aigaio (GR), Notio Aigaio (GR)  Kriti (GR) 
PORTUGAL 
15 
0 0 23 
LL 17 
Karlsruhe (DE), Freiburg (DE), Tübingen (DE), 
Darmstadt (DE), Arnsberg (DE), Rheinhessen-
Pfalz (DE), Alsace (FR), Franche-Comté (FR), 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (FR), Piemonte (IT), 
Valle d'Aosta (IT), Liguria (IT), Lombardia (IT), 
Trentino-Alto Adige (IT), Veneto (IT), Friuli-
Venezia Giulia (IT), Emilia-Romagna (IT), 
Toscana (IT) 
18 
Baleares (ES) 
1 0 0 36 
HL 0 
Gießen (DE)   Kassel (DE) 
Coarse (FR) 
3 
0 0 0 3 
LH 0 0 
Galicia (ES)   Andalucia (ES) 
Sterea Ellada (GR) 
3 
0 0 3 
Sum 65 50 30 0 0 145 
 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation table of growth rate by structural funds 1989-1999 
 Total structural funds 1989-1999 
Growth 
rate 
Not 
Sign. HH LL HL LH Sum 
Not Sign. 16 4 56 2 2 80 
HH 5 
Anatoliki Makedonia (GR), Kriti (GR), Kentriki 
Makedonia (GR), Dytiki Makedonia (GR), 
Thessalia (GR), Dytiki Ellada (GR), Peloponnisos 
(GR), Voreio Aigaio (GR), Notio Aigaio (GR), 
Dublin (IE), Centro (PT), Alentejo (PT), Algarve 
(PT), Northern Ireland (UK) 
14 
North East (UK) 
1 0 
Norte (PT) 
Lisboa e 
Vale do 
Tejo (PT) 
Scotland 
(UK) 
(3) 
23 
LL 18 0 
Karlsruhe (DE), Freiburg (DE), 
Tübingen (DE), Darmstadt (DE), 
Arnsberg (DE), Rheinhessen-Pfalz 
(DE), Alsace (FR), Franche-Comté 
(FR), Poitou-Charentes (FR), Limousin 
(FR), Auvergne (FR), Piemonte (IT), 
Veneto (IT), Valle d'Aosta (IT), 
Lombardia (IT), Trentino-Alto Adige 
(IT), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (IT) 
LUXEMBOURG 
18 
0 0 36 
HL 1 0 Gießen (DE)  Kassel (DE) 2 0 0 3 
LH 0 
Galicia (ES)  Andalucia (ES) 
Sterea Ellada (GR) 
3 
0 0 0 3 
Sum 40 21 77 2 5 145 
 
 
 
